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IN THE SUPREME

C~OURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH
MOLEN REES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 8860

EDWARD B. SCOTT,
Defendant and Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STEPHENS, BRAYTON & LOWE, and THOMAS
C. CUTHBERT, appearing specially for the sole purpose
of resisting this appeal from the Trial Court's order
quashing service of summons upon Dr. Edward B. Scott,
file the following brief of respondent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant attempted to commence an action for
alienation of affections against respondent, a resident
of California, by service of summons. The summons was
served by a Deputy Sheriff of Salt Lake County upon
Dr. Scott personally, but at the time of service, the deputy
sheriff did not endorse upon the copy left with Dr. Scott
the date upon which the same was served, nor did he
sign his name thereto, nor did he add his official title
thereto (Record p. 5).
On February 19, 1958, respondent, appearing spe-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

cially through his attorneys, filed a motion to quash
the service of summons. This motion was heard on
February 26, 1958, and said motion was granted.
Respondent takes issue with the statement of facts
contained in Appellant's Brief in the following respects:
(1) Statement on page 5 that on the 19th day of
February, 1958, attorney for Respondent receipted for a
copy of the complaint. There is nothing in the record
before this Court to support this statement, nor was
the point raised in any way before the trial court.
(2) Statement on page 4 as to reason for Dr.
Scott leaving the State of Utah. These matters are based
upon the affidavit of Dr. Molen Rees, Appellant, in
support of a motion to amend process, and were not
before the Court on the motion to quash summons. The
statements contained in said affidavit are incompetent
in stating a condition of mind of the Respondent and
are hearsay as to statements concerning any return of
Respondent to this state. Respondent points out that
under a special appearance it was not possible to resist
this motion and therefore no contrary evidence on these
points could be offered, and further that any attempts
to avoid process, except refusing service of summons,
are wholly immaterial to a question of whether a defendant is properly served with process.

STATEMENT OF POINT RELIED ON
POINT I.
THE FAILURE TO ENDORSE THE DATE AND PLA·CE
OF SERVICE ON COPY OF SUMMONS LEFT WITH DE·
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FENDANT WAS A FATAL DEFECT, AND WHERE TIMELY
ATTACKED BY MOTION, THE SERVICE MUST BE QUASHED IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THE DEFENDANT WAS
MISLED.

Rule 4(j) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
"At the time of service, the person making
such service shall endorse upon the copy of the
summons left for the person being served, the
date upon which the same was served, and shall
sign his name thereto, and, if an officer, add his
official title."
This rule is the same in substance as the provisions
of Sec. 104-5-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. This Court
in the case of Thomas vs. District Court, 171 Pac. 2d
667 (1946) specifically considered this provision in a
fact situation substantially identical to that in the case
at bar. In that case the plaintiff commenced an action
in Salt Lake County by filing a complaint, and a police
officer of the Salt Lake City Police Department served
the summons on Defendant personally but did not endorse upon the copy of the summons left with Defendant
the date of service, nor did the officer sign his name
or official title thereon. Defendant, appearing specially,
filed a motion to quash the service of summons. The
District Court denied the motion. Defendant then brought
the action before the Supreme Court by certiorari against
the District Court and Hon. J. Allan Crockett, District
Judge.
The defense was raised that the Defendant had
not been misled and therefore a motion to quash should
not be granted. The Court says at pages 670-1:
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"The date endorsed indicates the time within
which defendant must appear. If the date is not
endorsed the defendant would have no definite
date fixed by the summons to appear. The statute
directs that the server, at the time of service,
must endorse on the copy the date of service, and
leave it with defendant. This enables the person
served to check against the server the date, so
the return will [not] indicate a date different
from the real date served. If summons is served
in advance of filing complaint, and complaint is
not filed within ten days after service, the service
of summons and filing of complaint are both
void and the court should dismiss the action and
require the plaintiff to begin all over again. Section 104-5-9, L-:-.c.A. 1943: Reese vs. Judges, 52
Utah 520, 175 P. 601; James vs. Jensen, 50 Utah
485, 167 P. 827. If date is not endorsed on copy
defendant could not avail himself of this right
on the record. And where a summons is served
not on defendant personally but by leaving it at
his usual place of abode, during his absence perhaps for a few days, he would not know on his
return when he must appear or be in default.
These matters are not disputed by 'The Court,'
but it argues that Plaintiff here n1ust allege and
show he was Inisled b~~ the defect. Such is not
the provision of the statute. ~-\.nd we find no well
reasoned, adjudicated case. holding that where
service is attacked b~~ Inotion before pleading or
judgment, the trial court can inquire into the
question of being misled. * * *
"\Vithout prolonging the discussion we conclude t~at the failure to endorse the date ~nd place
of service on the cop~~ of the sun1n1ons as required
h)T Sec. 104-5-7 quoted supra is a fatal defect ·when
tin1ely attacked by n1otion, and such service of
sun11nons should be quashed.,
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In Appellant's Brief, the concurring opinion of the
Thomas case is urged for the proposition that failure to
endorse time of service is not jurisdictional. Whether or
not failure to endorse time of service is jurisdictional is
not a controlling factor in the case at bar but rather,
whether the lower court properly sustained a motion
to quash which was timely made. Careful analysis of
the concurring opinion demonstrates that Justices Wolfe
and McDonough were concerned first as to whether or
not certiorari was the proper remedy to be invoked in
that case, or whether it should have been prohibition;
and secondly, whether the failure to endorse made a
judgment based on such service void and subject to collateral attack or only voidable, which would be subject
only to a direct attack and would be waived if not raised
by timely motion. The concurring opinion holds that a
court has jurisdiction to determine the question of its
own jurisdiction and when it is in the process of determining its jurisdiction it is not exceeding its jurisdiction and therefore certiorari would not lie, the proper
writ being prohibition. On the second question the concurring opinion states, at pages 673-4:
"I am of the opinion that the irregularity
in the case at bar is such that the service was
voidable. By that I mean the defendant hy timel)·
and proper attack may have the service set aside.
Before judgment (absent a general appearance)
the proper attack was motion to quash the service.
Had a default judgment been entered - appeal
or motion to set aside the judgment as provided
for by Section 104-4-4, U.C.A. 1943, or suit in
equity to set aside the judgment would have been
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possible attacks. However, the service though defective gave the court jurisdiction of the defendant and had a judgment been entered pursuant
thereto it could not have been successfully attacked collaterally on grounds of no jurisdiction
of the defendant."
The foregoing quotation demonstrates that by following the reasoning of either the majority opinion or
concurring opinion the ruling of the trial court was correct in quashing summons in the case at bar.
That the result achieved in the Thomas case is
proper in the light of the history of this provision is
demonstrated by an examination of the enactment of
this provision in 1898. An almost identical provision
is to be found in our civil procedure since its enactment
as Section 2944 Revised Laws of Utah, 1898. Prior to
this time an action could be commenced only by the
filing of a complaint (See Section 3202, Compiled Laws
of Utah 1888). Section 29±-1 was added to the code at
the time our procedure was changed to permit the commencement of an action by service of summons, and was
taken from Section 2635a, Annotated Statutes of 'Yisconsin, 1889. The Wisconsin provision is substantially
identical with Sec. 2944, Revised Laws of Utah 1898,
with one very notable exception. Section 2635a provided
as follows:
"Any sheriff or other person, authorized to
serve a summons and who shall serYe a summons
which shall be the com1nencen1ent of an action
in any court in this state, shall at the time of
service thereof, indor~e upon th~ copy or copies
of such summons whiCh he shall deliver to the
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defendant or defendants in such action, the date
upon which the same was so served, and sign his
name thereto, and if an officer, his official title;
provided that nothing herein contained shall be
construed to invalidate a service not made in
conformity with the requirements of this act and
provided further that the officers making such
service and failing to make the indorsement thereon provided for, shall not tax any fees therefor."
When the Utah provision was enacted, the proviso
of the Wisconsin act that the failure to indorse did
not invalidate the service was omitted. This is a strong
indication that it was intended by the Utah law that
the failure to make the indorsement would invalidate the
service of summons.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Winters v.
Hughes, 3 Utah 443, 24 P. 759, under somewhat similar
provisions of Utah procedural laws said in the syllabus:
"A summons which fails to state the time
and place at which a defendant is required to appear and answer the complaint filed against him
is defective, and will be quashed upon motion
interposed before appearance and plea."
In seeking decisions from other jurisdictions on this
point, counsel has found only one other state with a
similar indorsement provision, namely, Georgia. In 1946,
the Georgia Supreme Court and Georgia Legislature
adopted an indorsement provision substantially the same
as the Utah provision. Rule 6 of Rules of Procedure,
Pleading and Practice in Civil Actions, Georgia Court
Rules, effective January 1, 1947, page 34; Georgia Laws
1946, p. 761 at p. 769.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

Three cases were decided by the Georgia Courts
under this provision holding failure to indorse the copy
served was jurisdictional. In the case of Payne v. Moore
Finance Company, 87 Ga. App. 627, 74 S.E. 2d 746
(1953) the court said :
"The only question in this case is whether
a judgment against a defendant is void where
he was personally served with a copy of petition
and process, and the serving officer failed to
show the date of service on such copy and sign
it, and where the defendant did nothing to waive
the omission. \Y e think that the requirement of
the Resolution passed by the General Assembly,
Ga. L. 1946, pp 761, 769, Code Annotated, Supp.
Sec. 81-202 providing that each copy served on
a defendant shall show a date of service signed
by the officer serving is mandatory and jurisdictional in the absence of waiver of jurisdiction of
the person."
See also Jennings ~:. Dacis, 92 Ga. App. 265, 88 S.E.
2d 544 (1955); Jones v. Roberts Jlarble Company, 90
Ga. App. 830, 84 S.E. 2d 469 (1954).
Appellant's brief argues that the failure to endorse
should be construed as hannless error under the provisions of Rule 61, U.R.C.P. This was the precise ground
upon which the defense ·was n1ade in the Thomas case,
supra. It is noteworthy that at the tilne of the decision
of the Thomas case, sections 104-14-7 and 104-39-3, r.C.~-i.
1943 were in effect and are substantially the same in
in effect as Rule 61. In the Thomas ease, this Court
ruled that the n1otion to quash should be granted irrespective of whether or not the defendant had been 1nisled.
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A person who faces a substantial judgment by default if his answer is not timely filed has the right to
know without any question the time within which he must
act. Under our procedure, the only proof he has of this
time is the endorsement of the date, signed by the
person serving the summons. This must be done at the
time of service and therefore is not subject to any
weaknesses of recollection of the person serving such
as a return of service might be when as much as five
days after the act. The copy of the summons left with
a defendant is the only record which he has in his
possession, and the most vital piece of information on
the summons, namely when the defendant must act, is
jmparted only if it is properly endorsed as required
by Rule 4 (j).
Appellant's Brief suggests on appeal for the first
time that counsel for Respondent obtained a copy of
the complaint from the clerk's office and that this makes
the failure to endorse harmless error. No evidence on
this point was presented at the hearing of the motion
to quash, no mention of the point was made to the trial
court or anywhere until it is mentioned in Appellant's
Brief, and there is nothing in the record to support
this statement. For this reason this court cannot consider
the matter on this appeal. It is respondent's contention
however that this point is immaterial in the case at bar
even if it were properly before the court. In the Thomas
case, supra, the action was commenced by filing of the
complaint and a copy of the complaint was served with
the summons. Even conceding the correctness of Appel-
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lant's statement that a copy of the complaint was obtained from the clerk's office, this fact would make the
two cases parallel at the time the copy of the complaint
was obtained from the clerk, and the case at bar would
still come within the ruling of the Thomas case that the
fact defendant was not misled by the failure to endorse
is immaterial.
It is respectfully urged that the trial court committed no error in its quashing of the service of summons
in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
STEPHENS, BRAYTON & LOWE,
and THOMAS C. CUTHBERT.
Attorneys for Respondent
ADDENDUM
Counsel, as an officer of this Court and not acting
for or on behalf of respondent, suggests that this Court
under its ruling in the case of Anderson v. Anderson,
3 U 2d 277, 282 Pac. 2d 845, should, of its own motion,
exam~e whether or not it has acquired jurisdiction of
this case on appeal in view of tins Court's holdings in
the case of Honerine llli·ning & Jlilliug Co. r. Tallerday
Steel Pipe <S· Tank Co., 30 Utah 449, 85 Pac. G:26 and
State T,ax Commission l'. Larsen, 110 Pac. 2d 558 that
no appeal will lie frmn an order of the district court
quashing summons where the action is not dismissed
but is still pending. Since appellant has filed no petition
for the granting of an appeal frmn an interlocutory
order within the tin1e prescribed under Rule 73 (a) as
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